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AN EXAMINATION OF PRODUCT HOPPING BY 
BRAND-NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS: THE PROBLEM AND A 
PROPOSED SOLUTION
DANIEL BURKE*
ABSTRACT
The balance between incentivizing innovation through exclusivity protection and 
maintaining competitive market conditions—including prices for consumers—is a 
difficult line to toe. Product hopping has characteristics that constitute a violation of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act because companies can maintain monopoly power in the 
pharmaceutical market. While some monopoly power is justified as an incentive for 
incredibly costly innovation, extended periods of exclusivity harms consumers by 
keeping prescription drug prices artificially inflated. Allowing generic drug 
manufacturers to compete sooner in the prescription drug market by disallowing 
product hopping by name-brand pharmaceutical drug companies will aid in driving 
down prices. Courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s test for whether a particular 
activity by a pharmaceutical drug company is monopolistic and a violation of the 
Sherman Act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has recently received increased focus from regulators 
and the general public due, in large part, to skyrocketing prescription drug prices.1
This increase contributes to a healthcare industry in the United States with higher costs 
than anywhere else in the world.2 Soaring costs may explain the role of domestic 
prescription drug manufacturers in the development of pharmaceuticals. Yet, how to 
curb these rising prices is contested. High costs affect families and individuals in the 
healthcare market.3 The meteoric rise of prescription drug prices occurred, in part, 
because of extended patent protection for brand-name pharmaceutical drugs, which 
prevents generic drug manufacturers from entering and competing in the 
pharmaceutical drug market.4
Recently, the policy implications and legality of the actions of some prescription 
drug manufacturers have concerned both regulators and generic drug manufacturers.5
                                                          
1 Peter Jaret, Prices Spike for Some Generic Drugs, AARP BULL. (July/Aug. 2015), 
http://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2015/prices-spike-for-generic-drugs.html. 
Turing Pharmaceuticals, at the time helmed by former hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli, 
famously acquired and subsequently increased the price of a drug, called Daraprim, from $13.50 
to $750 per tablet in September 2015. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a Tablet to 
$750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-
raises-protests.html. While Turing Pharmaceuticals and Mr. Shkreli were the recipients of sharp 
public criticism, this was not an isolated incident. Id. Rodelis Therapeutics, Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals, and Marathon Pharmaceuticals (to name a few) also have engaged in similar 
conduct, often increasing prescription drug prices overnight with no motivation other than to 
maximize profits at the expense of the often helpless consumer. Id. Some commentators 
characterize this behavior as incredibly harmful to consumers, laying the groundwork for legal 
discourse targeted at solving this problem. Id.
2 Jason Kane, Health Costs: How the U.S. Compares with Other Countries, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/health-costs-how-the-us-
compares-with-other-countries/.
3 Jessica Firger, Many Insured Americans Can’t Afford Health Care, NEWSWEEK (May 21, 
2015), http://www.newsweek.com/many-americans-insured-cant-afford-health-care-334624.
4 Alison Kodjak, Tighter Patent Rules Could Help Lower Drug Prices, Study Shows, NPR 
(Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/23/491053523/tighter-
patent-rules-could-help-lower-drug-prices-study-shows.
5 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 2016); New 
York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015). Legal scholars 
scrutinize the legality of the actions of prescription drug manufacturers, as reflected by an 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/8
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Regulators are showing interest in defending consumers, who ultimately shoulder the 
high cost of drugs that are necessary to maintain health.6 Generic drug manufacturers 
are showing interest because of the difficulties extended patent protection places on 
their business.7 Although certain legislation has made it easier for generic drug 
manufacturers to enter the competitive market, existing legislation has not gone far 
enough to mitigate the detrimental effects that extended patent protections have on 
generic manufacturers and consumers. The State of New York brought suit against 
Actavis PLC (“Actavis”) alleging an antitrust violation for Actavis’s product hopping 
scheme. In that scheme, the company discontinued its drug’s old formulation and 
planned to release a slightly altered version of it, with the goal of preventing generic 
drug manufacturers from competing in the memantine drug market (i.e. drugs used in 
the treatment of Parkinson’s disease).8 The Second Circuit upheld an injunction that 
required Actavis to continue to manufacture the old formulation of its drug, finding 
that Actavis engaged in illegal, monopolistic behavior.9 Conversely, the Third Circuit 
recently decided a case in favor of a brand-name drug manufacturer, Warner Chilcott, 
finding no error in the lower court’s determination that Warner Chilcott’s behavior 
was not anticompetitive.10 Warner Chilcott entered into an agreement with a partner 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturer in response to declining sales of their drug, 
Doryx.11 The agreement changed Doryx capsules to tablets, removed the capsules 
from the market, and marketed the tablets to pharmacies and doctors as the new form 
of the drug.12 The “dual-scored” tablets contained 150 milligrams (“mg”), replacing 
both 75 mg and 100 mg capsules.13 The Third Circuit found no evidence that Warner 
Chilcott monopolized the relevant market and that even if Warner Chilcott had 
monopoly power, its behavior was not inherently anticompetitive.14 Although the 
Third Circuit attempted to distinguish this case from the Second Circuit’s decision in 
                                                          
increase in law review publications on the problem. See, e.g., Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust 
Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1471
(2008); Benjamin M. Miller, Product Hopping: Monopolization or Innovation?, 22 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 89, 89 (2016).
6 Consumers disproportionately shoulder the burden of high drug prices, despite 
regulators’ attempts to alleviate the burden. See generally Is There a Cure for High Drug 
Prices?, CONSUMER REP. (July 29, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/cure-for-
high-drug-prices/.
7 Himanshu Gupta et al., Patent Protection Strategies, 2 J. PHARMACY & BIOALLIED SCI.,
2, 2 (2010).
8 Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 642.
9 Id. at 663.
10 Mylan Pharm., Inc., 838 F.3d at 438.
11 Id. at 429.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 429–30. “Dual-scored” refers to a tablet with a groove down the center, allowing a 
patient to divide the tablet into two smaller doses to facilitate particular strength requirements. 
Id. at 430.
14 Id. at 438.
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Actavis, the cases represent the same issue.15 The problem is pervasive, and these cases 
are two examples in an industry fraught with issues. This circuit split makes the issue 
ripe for review by the United States Supreme Court.
While the disagreement between the Second and Third Circuits means this issue 
will generate great interest from a myriad of groups seeking to persuade other 
circuits—and potentially the Supreme Court—of the merits of their arguments, this is 
not a far-away issue relegated to legalese and academic arguments made before our 
nation’s highest court. This issue affects millions of Americans. For seventy-six-year-
old Jacqueline Racener, a new prescription to fight her leukemia cost $8,000 per year 
out of pocket, a price she could not afford.16 She is not wealthy. As a middle class 
American, the government prohibits her from receiving those federal prescription drug 
subsidies that help to defray costs only for the poorest Americans.17 Sadly, Ms. 
Racener was only able to qualify for assistance through a drug-maker-funded 
nonprofit program when her work hours (and as a result, salary) were drastically cut.18
Like Racener, millions of Americans suffer because of high prescription drug costs.
To settle this issue, courts must confront the issue of whether product hopping 
constitutes illegal activity. At the center of this debate are two complex areas of law: 
intellectual property and antitrust. Patent law, a subsection of intellectual property, 
and antitrust law are inherently competing theories at their cores; the former grants 
exclusivity to spur innovation, and the latter proscribes monopolistic activities to 
foster competition.19 Allowing increased competition generally allows increased 
innovation and ultimately benefits consumers because the market actors are able to 
find better ways to produce a product or deliver a service in a cheaper, faster, and 
overall more efficient manner.20 The patent system incentivizes the infusion of capital 
into research and development through the de facto monopoly power conferred on the 
holder of a patent.21 The correct balance between these competing theories, therefore, 
is difficult to achieve. In the field of prescription drug innovation, however, the 
balance should shift toward fostering competition and allowing generic manufacturers 
to enter the market sooner.
This Note will argue that product hopping is a violation of § 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act because prescription drug manufacturers engage in monopolistic 
conduct when they change drug formulations and marketing strategies, thereby forcing 
consumers to purchase the company’s new drug and preventing competition from 
                                                          
15 Id. at 428.
16 Joseph Walker, Patients Struggle with High Drug Prices, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/patients-struggle-with-high-drug-prices-1451557981.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Amy Maxmen, Biotech Report Says IP Spurs Innovation, NATURE (June 20, 2012, 6:17 
AM), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/06/intellectual-property-spurs-innovation.html; 
Antitrust: An Overview, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust (last updated July 2017).
20 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION 
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8–9 (2003) [hereinafter FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION].
21 Id.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/8
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generic drug manufacturers.22 This Note will also advocate that the pharmaceutical 
industry would benefit from weaker patent protection because more companies would 
be able to compete in the prescription drug market sooner than they currently can, 
which will ultimately lower costs for individuals. Finally, this Note will argue that the 
Supreme Court should decide this issue in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach 
because that approach better interprets the existing law, the goals of jurisprudence, 
and the future of legal theory in this area.23
II. EXPLANATION OF PRODUCT HOPPING, THE PATENT SYSTEM, AND MONOPOLY 
ANALYSIS
A. Definition and Influence of Product Hopping
“Product hopping” refers to a business method wherein a company owning a patent 
on a brand-name drug alters the drug prior to the expiration of the drug’s original 
patent exclusivity period to create a new drug, which can then receive new patent 
exclusivity.24 Alteration of the drug can occur in several ways, such as in the formula, 
the administration method, the administration frequency, or a host of other minor 
differences from the parent drug.25 The key concept is that the drug does not offer an 
improvement over the prior drug in terms of effectiveness at treating the targeted 
illness.26 The company then attempts to shift its customers to the new drug to protect 
its market share.27 The incentive for manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceutical 
drugs to engage in this practice is substantial. Consumer spending on pharmaceutical 
drugs in the United States is nearly $425 billion per year and is estimated to top $600 
billion by 2020.28 AbbVie Inc.’s Humira, for example, generated worldwide sales of 
$12.5 billion in 2014, representing the best selling prescription drug in the world.29
Brand-name drugs enjoy exclusivity for the duration of their patents, which bars 
competition and allows manufacturers the discretion to charge virtually any price for 
their products.30 Although an outlier, Kalydeco, a drug that treats cystic fibrosis, went 
                                                          
22 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
23 Compare id. with Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 
2016).
24 Cheng, supra note 5, at 1472; Miller, supra note 5, at 94.
25 Cheng, supra note 5, at 1472.
26 Id.
27 Id.; Miller, supra note 5, at 94.
28 MURRAY AITKEN ET AL., IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINES USE AND 
SPENDING IN THE U.S. 5 (2016), https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IMS-
Institute-US-Drug-Spending-2015.pdf.
29 Peter Loftus, AbbVie Profit Tops Estimates and Sees Higher Humira Sales by 2020,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/abbvie-boosts-outlook-as-results-top-
views-1446205731.
30 Rina Shaikh-Lesko, Pill Prices Are Hiked Up All the Time in the Low-Income World,
NPR (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/12/23/460725705/pill-
prices-are-hiked-up-all-the-time-in-the-low-income-world.
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on sale in 2012 and was priced at $294,000 per year.31 As a so-called “orphan drug,” 
Kalydeco enjoys governmental benefits for treating rare conditions or diseases that 
may not be represented in the panoply of the pharmaceutical drug market.32 Another 
example is Viekira Pak, produced by AbbVie, which costs about $34,600 for a thirty-
day supply and treats individuals with Hepatitis C.33 Sovaldi, another drug which treats 
Hepatitis C, costs around $81,000 for a full treatment.34 These drugs are just a few 
examples of the extravagant prices that brand-name pharmaceutical companies, like 
Gilead, Bristol-Meyers Squibb, Valeant, and AbbVie, charge for their products.35
Although the typical customer is unlikely to pay the full price of a given drug, the 
industry-wide increases in drug prices disproportionately affect those who are least 
able to pay because the poor are less likely to benefit from insurance-defrayed prices.36
In 2016, approximately twenty percent of households making less than $36,000 
annually were uninsured, and eleven percent of adult citizens in the United States 
overall were uninsured.37 Uninsured adults are also more likely to avoid taking 
medication to save money than those with insurance, although both groups employ 
this strategy.38 Clearly, the rise in healthcare costs—pharmaceutical drugs 
specifically—most significantly burdens those individuals who are least capable of 
affording these price increases, which are sometimes astronomical.39 Additionally, the 
                                                          
31 Barry Werth, A Tale of Two Drugs, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 22, 2013),  
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520441/a-tale-of-two-drugs/.
32 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Developing Products for Rare Diseases & Conditions,
FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/ucm2005525
.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2017); see Larry Luxner, #NORDsummit—Despite Criticism, 
Orphan Drug Act Is Working to Advance Needed Treatments, FDA Says, CYSTIC FIBROSIS NEWS 
TODAY (Oct. 19, 2017), https://cysticfibrosisnewstoday.com/2017/10/19/nordsummit-orphan-
drug-act-is-working-to-advance-rare-disease-treatments-fda-says/.
33 Lydia Ramsey, The 10 Most Expensive Drugs in the US, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-drugs-in-america-2016-9/#viekira-pak-
abbvie-34600-1.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Katie Thomas, Drug Prices Keep Rising Despite Intense Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/business/drug-prices-keep-rising-despite-intense-
criticism.html?_r=0. The recent repeal of the individual mandate could exacerbate this further
as healthy, poorer Americans drop out of the healthcare market because of an inability to pay 
for the insurance offered in the exchanges, driving up the costs for the remaining participants. 
Sy Mukherjee, The GOP Tax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s Individual Mandate. Here’s What That 
Means for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/20/tax-bill-individual-
mandate-obamacare/.
37 Stephanie Marken, U.S. Uninsured Rate Remains at Historical Low of 11.0%, GALLUP 
(July 11, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/193556/uninsured-rate-remains-historical-
low.aspx.
38 See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 119,
STRATEGIES USED BY ADULTS TO REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS (2013).
39 Shaikh-Lesko, supra note 30 (stating that the price of Daraprim increased 5,000%, from 
$13 per pill to $750 per pill).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss2/8
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pharmaceutical market is unique in that consumers cannot purchase prescription drugs 
without a physician’s order (i.e. a prescription).40 This dynamic creates an imperfect 
market because physicians have little incentive to select a lower-cost product, and 
patients are forced to pay for the product selected.41 This imperfect market requires 
additional examination to ensure that the market is not a harmful or burdensome 
environment for consumers.
Thus, generic drugs are important for controlling pharmaceutical costs. Automatic 
drug substitution laws, which states have adopted for the past few decades, typically 
accomplish this control.42 These laws allow pharmacists to “substitute” an equivalent 
generic prescription drug when a consumer is prescribed a brand-name drug.43 In 1984, 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 
commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, named after the two sponsors of the 
bill.44 Congress intended, in part, for the Hatch-Waxman Act to incentivize the 
production of generic pharmaceutical drugs to help lower industry costs.45 Hatch-
Waxman allowed manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical drugs to rely on the studies 
and evidence that the brand-name drug manufacturer provided to the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) when the brand-name drug was first being 
developed.46 Provided that the generic is the “biological equivalent” to the brand name 
drug, an abbreviated application may be filed by the generic drug manufacturer.47
Referred to as an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”),48 the time and cost of 
the applications are significant.49 A generic manufacturer’s ability to rely on the due 
                                                          
40 Brief for Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at 4, 
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2236) 
[hereinafter Brief for FTC].
41 Id.
42 Id. at 5.
43 Id. (observing that pharmacists prefer making these substitutions because their profit 
margins for generic drugs are higher than profit margins for brand-name drugs).
44 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
45 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984); Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The 
Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN
(2010), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=dfef53ed-54e4-
491a-802a-01becb1f47bb.
46 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2016); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 
644 (2d Cir. 2015). For a critical discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act, see Emily Michiko 
Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 248 (2012).
47 Morris, supra note 46, at 248.
48 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), FDA.GOV,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandAppro
ved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/default.htm (last 
updated Nov. 28, 2017).
49 Alexander Gaffney, FDA Publishes All User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2014, REG. AFF.
PROF’LS. SOC’Y. (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.raps.org/news-articles/news-articles/2013/8/fda-
publishes-all-user-fee-rates-for-fiscal-year-2014.
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
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diligence of the brand-name manufacturer is highly beneficial because this reliance 
streamlines the introduction of generic prescription drugs by lowering time restraints 
and costs.50 Generic drug prices are approximately eighty-five percent lower than their 
respective brand-name counterparts, resulting in the sharp attenuation of the market 
shares of brand name drugs and the eventual reduction of such market shares to about 
ten percent of the total market.51 Coupled with automatic substitution laws, generic 
prescription drugs aid in lowering industry costs by offering an equivalent product at 
a cheaper price.
Hatch-Waxman’s second thrust sought to spur innovation of brand name 
pharmaceuticals by affording manufacturers extended term patent protection as an off-
set against the time required to navigate the FDA regulatory process.52 This allowed 
companies a possibility of up to twenty-five years and six months of patent 
protection.53 The additional time of protection was valuable to companies because of 
the massive investment required for the development of a new drug—almost $2.6 
billion according to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development.54
Manufacturers can charge any price they desire during the exclusivity period, largely 
because Medicare and Medicaid, the largest insurers in the United States, are 
prohibited from negotiating prices.55
The controversy surrounding product hopping is grounded in the theory that the 
extension of patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs is an illegal monopoly and 
thus a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”).56 The Supreme 
Court defines monopoly power as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition”57 and requires parties to satisfy two elements to establish a violation of 
the Sherman Act: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth 
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”58 Patent protection in the United States grants a patent holder “the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention” to which 
                                                          
50 Brief for FTC, supra note 40, at 3.
51 Id. at 6.
52 See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 2015).
53 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2017); 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2017).
54 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of 
R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20–33 (2016); Cost to Develop and Win Marketing 
Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS CTR. FOR STUDY DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study.
55 Dennis Thompson, What’s Behind the Sharp Rise in Prescription Drug Prices?, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-behind-the-sharp-rise-in-
prescription-drug-prices/ (stating that Medicare and Medicaid cover one out of every three 
Americans).
56 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2017).
57 United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (footnote 
omitted).
58 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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the holder is given an exclusive right.59 While a patent does not grant its holder a legal 
monopoly, the de facto result of extended exclusivity in the pharmaceutical industry 
is a monopoly in effect.60 As a result, the United States must achieve a balance between 
providing sufficient inventive to brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
innovate and allowing competition in the prescription drug market.
B. Brief Description of the Patent System in the United States
A brief description of the patent system in the United States is required to better 
understand the issues involved in this Note. Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”61 In United States jurisprudence, 
a patent is a grant of a property right by the government to the inventor, which reserves 
to the inventor “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention” defined in the patent.62 Patent rights are jurisdiction specific, 
meaning the right to exclude others from using the invention is enforceable only within 
the territory where the patent is acquired; thus, inventors must acquire patents in each 
jurisdiction where inventors intend to enforce their patent rights.63 While this 
requirement imposes a significant burden on inventors wishing to obtain patent 
protection in more than one country, entities such as the European Patent Office 
(“EPO”) help streamline the application process for member countries.64 Still, filing, 
prosecuting, and eventually obtaining a patent can be time consuming and expensive, 
compounded further by the number of jurisdictions in which inventors wish to file.65
All of this added cost ultimately means inventors and corporations that acquire patents 
will hope to capture the economic benefit of their property right by recuperating some 
of those costs by increasing prices for consumers.
                                                          
59 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2017).
60 Dean Baker, Opinion, End Patent Monopolies on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/09/23/should-the-government-impose-drug-
price-controls/end-patent-monopolies-on-drugs.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
62 General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents. 
Although historians generally accept that an informal patent system originated in Italy, the first 
known official patent was conferred to John of Utynam of England in 1449 for a glass-making 
process. Marcio Luis Ferreira Nascimento, The First Patents and the Rise of Glass Technology,
9 RECENT INNOVATIONS CHEMICAL ENGINEERING 1, 1–2 (2016), 
http://www.lamav.ufba.br/pdf/RICE9.pdf.
63 Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Overseas, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protecting-intellectual-
property-rights-ipr (last updated Oct. 1, 2015).
64 Principles, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/about-us/office.html (last updated June 
13, 2017).
65 Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/.
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The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), passed in 2011, was a significant 
departure from the jurisprudence of the patent system in the United States.66 Notably, 
the AIA changed the United States from a “first to invent” to a “first to file” system.67
This change means that the first inventor to file an application for a given invention is 
deemed to have invented it, regardless of whether evidence suggests that another 
inventor actually invented it first.68 Some describe the “first to file” system as being 
incredibly harmful to inventors, particularly inventors that are smaller and less 
resourced.69 Additionally, the AIA changed the understanding of prior commercial 
use, which is a defense to a claim of patent infringement founded on the theory that 
the alleged infringer used, in good-faith, the invention within one year prior to the 
otherwise would-be enforceability date.70 This understanding has particular relevance 
to the pharmaceutical industry because the statute redefined “commercial use” to 
include research studies and due diligence conducted to comply with regulatory 
requirements.71 The statute thus creates an incentive for companies to ensure that 
quality record keeping is part of their internal innovation and patent procedures.72
Although likely innocuous, this provision at the very least privileges companies to be 
able to raise such a defense in any potential dispute so long as the companies have the 
wherewithal and ability to implement and understand the importance of streamlined 
procedures.73 The AIA was the first major change to the United States patent system 
in many years; other suggestions to improve the system have not all been incorporated 
or even addressed.74
In the United States, two main requirements are hallmarks of any valid patent: the 
novelty75 and nonobvious requirements.76 To be “novel,” a patent must not have been 
                                                          
66 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.); Paul Morinville, How the America Invents Act Harmed 
Inventors, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/10/america-
invents-act-harmed-inventors/id=72551/.
67 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–341 (2016).
68 Gene Quinn, First to File Means File First! The Risk of Not Immediately Filing a Patent
Application, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 9, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/01/09/first-to-
file-means-file-first-filing-a-patent-application/id=64809/.
69 Morinville, supra note 66.
70 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2016).
71 PHARM. TECH. EDS., Patent Reform and the Pharmaceutical Industry: From First-to-File 
to Post-Grant Review and Beyond, 7 PHARM. TECH. SOURCING & MGMT. (2011), 
http://www.pharmtech.com/patent-reform-and-pharmaceutical-industry-first-file-post-grant-
review-and-beyond.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Ted O’Donoghue, A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation, RAND J.
ECON. 654, 654 (1998).
75 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).
76 Id. § 103.
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“patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use . . . .”77 To be 
“nonobvious,” the claimed invention must not have been “obvious . . . to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”78 Together, 
these are two of the most integral requirements with which patent attorneys must be 
familiar, as they account for many patent application rejections.79 Discussed infra,
while current prescription drug manufacturers can alter their drugs to meet both of 
these requirements, the judiciary and legislature should each take active steps to make 
obtaining a new patent more difficult when related to an existing drug whose patent is 
set to expire imminently.
C. Effect of Patent System on Innovation
Some credit the patenting system as a major driving force in the expansion of the 
United States economy.80 Ostensibly, patent protection fuels innovation and economic 
growth.81 Studies show that innovation in countries with a sophisticated patent system 
exceeds innovation in countries without a formal system.82 Patents serve to boost 
innovation naturally; the inventor discloses her invention to capture a window of 
exclusivity.83 Disclosure subsequently allows other innovators to build upon that 
knowledge base with their own innovative approach. Each successive innovation or 
improvement to a particular technology allows the next innovator to accelerate the 
technology’s quality or effectiveness. This accelerated technological expansion 
justifies the temporary anticompetitive results that patent protection necessarily 
requires.84
However, evidence suggests that stronger patent protection may not equally 
benefit all industries.85 Software, for example, has traditionally enjoyed weaker patent 
                                                          
77 Id. § 102(a)(1).
78 Id. § 103.
79 Gene Quinn, Understanding the Patent Process: Rejections vs. Objections,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/02/patent-process-
rejections-vs-objections/id=67761/.
80 Economic Development and Patents, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/economic.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
81 Albert G.Z. Hu & I.P.L. Png, Patent Rights and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-
Country Panels of Manufacturing Industries, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 1, 25 (2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_econ_ge_5_10/wipo_ip_econ_ge_5_10
_ref_huandpng.pdf.
82 David Kline, Do Patents Truly Promote Innovation?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/15/do-patents-truly-promote-innovation/id=48768/.
83 Richard D. Nelson & Roberto Mazzoleni, Economic Theories About the Costs and 
Benefits of Patents, in NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 17, 18–19 (1997).
84 Patents and Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV. 26–27 (2004), https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/24508541.pdf.
85 James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND 
J. ECON. 611, 611–12 (2009).
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protection than other industries (e.g. pharmaceutical).86 One can hardly argue that the 
software industry has suffered from lack luster innovation pace as a result.87 One 
theory suggests that the pace of innovation in relation to software may be inhibited by 
stronger patent protection because software innovation is “sequential,” meaning 
successive advancements build on existing technology, and “complementary,” 
meaning different innovators attempt to advance the technology in different 
manners.88 The sequential and complementary nature of software innovation, 
therefore, benefits from imitators augmenting innovation, rather than innovation 
driven by stronger patent protection.89 Overall, the patent system is one of the best 
ways in which society can build upon a knowledge base in any given industry.90
However, acquiring a patent is not the only way to advance a particular technology.
D. Background of Judicial Analysis of a Potential Violation of the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act was adopted in 1890 as “a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”91
Along with the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act 
allows courts to analyze which combinations of businesses will be deemed illegal, on 
a case-by-case basis, to protect the goal of these laws and foster competition for the 
benefit of consumers.92 Certain types of conduct are deemed so harmful to competition 
as to violate the Sherman Act inherently.93
When analyzing a potential violation of the Sherman Act, courts must determine 
whether the defendant “monopolize[d], or attempt[ed] to monopolize . . . any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States . . . .”94 The plaintiff must show that 
the defendant had monopoly power in the relevant market and “that [the defendant] 
willfully acquired or maintained that power” apart from improving business process, 
product, or experience.95 Pragmatically, most circuit courts have adopted three 
                                                          
86 Ania Jedrusik & Phil Wadsworth, Patent Protection for Software-Implemented
Inventions, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Feb. 2017), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/01/article_0002.html.
87 See generally ROBERT J. SHAPIRO, SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, THE U.S. SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRY: AN ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT (2014),
https://www.siia.net/Admin/FileManagement.aspx/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yLPW0SrBfk4
%3D&portalid=0.
88 Bessen & Maskin, supra note 85, at 612.
89 Id.
90 Kline, supra note 82.
91 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); The Antitrust Laws, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).
95 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 651 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).
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requirements that a plaintiff must prove to show that a defendant has engaged in 
monopolistic conduct: “(1) the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power,” which includes analyzing the relevant market.96
The Supreme Court has characterized the goal of the Sherman Act as intending to 
“protect the public from the failure of the market.”97 However, courts will not find 
conduct that amounts to effective business techniques to be anticompetitive and a 
violation of the Sherman Act.98 This is because the purpose of the courts is not to 
punish competitors when they outcompete ineffective businesses.99 Instead, the Sixth 
Circuit has characterized the goal of the courts, with respect to determining whether 
specific conduct violates the Sherman Act, as being able to decide between good 
business and anticompetitive conduct.100 The Sixth Circuit has stated that 
“[a]nticompetitive conduct is conduct designed to destroy competition, not just to 
eliminate a competitor.”101 Rather, the successful competitor should be rewarded by 
the market.102 The proper balance between deciding which conduct is anticompetitive 
and which conduct is simply shrewd business is a difficult one. With this background, 
this Note will proceed to analyze the complex issue of “product hopping” in the 
pharmaceutical industry.
III. PRODUCT HOPPING CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Product Hopping Constitutes a Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act Because It 
Grants the Patent Holder Illegal Monopoly Power
The practice of product hopping constitutes a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 
vis-à-vis a monopolistic practice. Exclusivity necessarily allows a company to control 
market prices, as characterized by the Supreme Court.103 Under the Sherman Act, two 
factors must be met to establish a monopoly offense.104 The first is “the possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market,” and the second is “the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”105 In effect, 
a patent is the predicate for a legal monopoly granted to its holder by the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office. Brand-name drug companies control, if not the entire 
                                                          
96 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993).
97 Id. at 458.
98 Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1982).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
104 Id. at 570–71.
105 Id.
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market, a highly significant portion of it, as previously discussed.106 While competitors 
could compete with a different formulation of a prescription drug, in practice this 
rarely occurs because of the cost of drug development.107 The first prong of the test, 
therefore, is satisfied. The company that has patent protection on a product has the 
power to create a monopoly in the relevant market, albeit a “legal” one for a limited 
duration.
The second prong of the test, which requires the defendant company to maintain 
its monopoly without growth or development of its product, is more difficult to 
establish and highly fact specific.108 The patent holder may assert that the alterations 
result in a superior product, qualifying the holder for the right to a new patent (i.e. 
continued monopoly power in the same market). However, the nature of product 
hopping is that the patent holder maintains that monopoly power “as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product . . . .”109
Companies can do this by changing the frequency of administration of the drug, 
changing the potency of the drug, or changing the chemical composition of the drug 
without altering the drug’s efficacy or limiting potential side effects.110 The lack of 
meaningful, clinical improvement after a change in the drug sufficient to warrant the 
grant of a new patent constitutes product hopping per se.111 As a result, the second 
prong of the test is met absent any significant, clinically-relevant improvement in the 
particular prescription drug.
Addressing the Supreme Court’s characterization of the three requirements, which 
most appellate courts have adopted to demonstrate monopolistic activity,112 reinforces 
this conclusion. The first test, requiring that the plaintiff show “predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct,”113 is met because patents are inherently anticompetitive. A 
patent, as previously described, is a right to exclude others from using the protected 
process or technology.114 Exclusion by statutory right, although legal and endorsed by 
the Constitution and jurisprudence, purposefully prevents competition for a limited 
time as a means of fostering and furthering innovation.
                                                          
106 Proportion of Branded versus Generic Prescription Drug Revenues in the United States 
from 2005 to 2016, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/205036/proportion-of-brand-
to-generic-prescription-sales/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
107 What Are the Major Barriers to Entry for New Companies in the Drugs Sector?,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 22, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052215/what-are-
major-barriers-entry-new-companies-drugs-sector.asp.
108 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015).
109 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71.
110 Roseanne Spector, Me-Too Drugs: Sometimes They’re Just the Same Old, Same Old,
STAN. MED. MAG. (2005), http://sm.stanford.edu/archive/stanmed/2005summer/drugs-
metoo.html.
111 See Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638.
112 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
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114 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2017).
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The second test, requiring the plaintiff to show intent to monopolize,115 is met by 
the pharmaceutical company’s act of filing and obtaining patent protection. When a 
company files a patent application, the company’s goal, or intent, is to obtain a patent 
for that technology. As previously mentioned, a patent essentially grants a legal 
monopoly for a set period of time to its holder.116 Therefore, inherent in every patent 
application is the applicant’s intent ultimately to obtain the right to exclude others 
from engaging in the process or using the technology described in his application. 
Furthermore, predatory intent is, in part, established by examining the barriers to entry 
in a relevant market.117 If a market has high barriers to entry, the company engaging 
in the questionable conduct will more likely be able to benefit from predatory prices.118
Conversely, in a market with relatively low barriers to entry, such tactics will not prove 
as fruitful.119 The barriers to entry in the prescription drug manufacturing market are 
high. As mentioned, entering the market requires a significant amount of research and 
development cost (totaling in the billions for some drugs), a massive amount of 
marketing investment, and technical expertise.120 One can easily see how the market’s 
characteristics may discourage competitors from entry into this market. Coupled with 
high drug prices, the conduct discussed here easily meets this second test.
Finally, the third question, which requires a showing of a likelihood of obtaining 
monopoly power,121 is met based on whether a patent for a similar drug is actually 
obtained. If obtained, a patent is not only a “dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power,”122 but in fact is a conclusion of monopoly power for the duration 
of the patent.123 In the United States, the duration of a patent is generally twenty years 
after the date the inventor filed the patent application.124
Both the Second and Third Circuits emphasized, correctly, the importance of 
determining the relevant market for analysis of potentially monopolistic conduct. The 
relevant market can be demonstrated either directly “through evidence of control over 
prices or the exclusion of competition” or indirectly by showing one company’s 
market share.125 Thus, a company’s claim that it does not control a majority or even 
close to a majority of the relevant market (as measured by overall sales) is not 
                                                          
115 Spectrum Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456.
116 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENTS AND HOW TO GET ONE 7 (2008).
117 Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 89 (2d Cir. 1981).
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., id.
120 Kodjak, supra note 4.
121 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
122 Id. at 447.
123 TECH. TRANSFER OFFICE, SAN DIEGO STATE UNIV., PATENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 1, https://newscenter.sdsu.edu/researchaffairs/files/02478-Patent_faqs_current.pdf.
124 Id. at 3; see Gene Quinn, How Long Does a Patent Last?, IPWATCHDOG (July 26, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/26/how-long-does-a-patent-last/id=50534/.
125 New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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dispositive.126 Instead, how a company’s conduct affects prices can demonstrate 
whether or not that company possesses monopoly power in the relevant market.127
Keeping this in mind, courts should consider not only explicit evidence of a 
particular drug’s control of a market (i.e., sales), but also that company’s effect on 
prices, which is ultimately the consumers’ greatest concern, and, intrinsically, the 
governmental agencies that regulate this area of the law and commerce.128 Although 
the Third Circuit found Doryx to be interchangeable with other similar medications,129
the determination of similarity should occur earlier in the process. For example, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office is better equipped to determine the issue 
of whether a particular drug is equivalent or essentially equivalent to other existing 
prescription drugs based on the Office’s employment of a huge number of subject 
matter experts in a myriad of industries.130
B. Extended Exclusivity Protection for Brand-Name Prescription Drugs is an 
Anticompetitive Harm that Does Not Outweigh the Procompetitive Benefit Because 
Generic Drugs Cannot Enter the Market to Compete
Another way that courts determine whether the second prong of the test (in an 
analysis of a potential monopoly) is satisfied is by applying the rule of reason test.131
The rule of reason test requires that courts examine the totality of the circumstances, 
rather than treat the potential violation of the Sherman Act as a per se violation, to 
determine whether the practice promotes competition in the relevant market.132 The 
rule of reason test requires that once the plaintiff has established the defendant’s 
monopoly power, the monopolist may offer justifications for maintaining that 
power.133 The plaintiff then may argue that “the anticompetitive harm outweighs the 
procompetitive benefit.”134 Relevant factors in determining whether a particular case 
of product hopping is a violation of the Sherman Act include looking at whether the 
conduct is anticompetitive, coerces consumers, and impedes competition.135
Generic drug manufacturers are inhibited from entering the prescription drug 
market when name-brand drug manufacturers are granted extended exclusivity 
                                                          
126 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
127 Id. at 433–34.
128 Brief for FTC, supra note 40, at 4.
129 Mark A. Ford & Peter A. Spaeth, 3rd Circ. Weighs in on Product-Hopping, LAW360
(Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/855055/3rd-circ-weighs-in-on-product-
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130 Dennis Crouch, USPTO’s Swelling Examiner Rolls, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 30, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/11/usptos-swelling-examiner.html.
131 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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protection, particularly due to automatic substitution laws.136 Automatic substitution 
laws allow pharmacists to substitute a generic bioequivalent drug for the more 
expensive name-brand prescription drug.137 Bioequivalence is defined as:
the absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the 
active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or 
pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action 
when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an 
appropriately designed study. Where there is an intentional difference in 
rate (e.g., in certain extended-release dosage forms), certain pharmaceutical 
equivalents or alternatives may be considered bioequivalent if there is no 
significant difference in the extent to which the active ingredient or moiety 
from each product becomes available at the site of drug action.138
This definition allows pharmacists to substitute generic prescription drugs, which 
are cheaper, for brand-name prescription drugs when filling the prescription.139 Prior 
to a pharmacist’s ability to make this substitution, the FDA must first determine that 
the generic drug is “interchangeable.”140 The goal of permitting this type of 
substitution is clear; allowing an equivalent, cheaper prescription benefits consumers 
because they receive the treatment needed at a lower cost.
However, brand-name prescription drug manufacturers change the composition of 
the drug such that the new brand-name drug is no longer bioequivalent with the generic 
drug.141 The intention of the new drug is still to treat the same disease or disorder as 
before, but the new drug is no longer seen as “equivalent” in the eyes of the FDA.142
When brand-name prescription drug manufacturers do this, pharmacists cannot 
substitute the cheaper generic that would have been appropriate prior to changes to the 
brand-name drug. As a result, the generic drug manufacturer cannot enter the market 
due to state laws.143 The consumer must spend more money on a brand-name drug 
despite the existence of a generic prescription drug that would provide the same 
treatment if the consumer had access to it.
                                                          
136 BUREAU OF ECON., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS 1 (1985).
137 Id.
138 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2016).
139 Id.; see BUREAU OF ECON., supra note 136.
140 Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Legislation Related to Biologic Medications and 
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141 See generally Daphne E. Smith, Bioequivalence and Interchangeability of Generic 
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143 Cauchi, supra note 140.
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For example, in the case of Forest Pharmaceuticals (the subsidiary of Actavis 
against whom the State of New York brought an action for engaging in allegedly 
monopolistic activity), a new version of their memantine drug, Namenda, is now 
available as Namenda XR (which stands for “extended relief”).144 However, as a result 
of the Second Circuit’s ruling in that case, generic memantine is available to 
consumers for half the price of branded Namenda.145 Had Forest (and by corollary, 
Actavis) been successful in its pursuit to maintain exclusivity in the memantine drug 
market, consumers would not be able to access generic memantine until the Namenda 
XR patent expires in 2025 or even later if the manufacturer altered the formula once 
more.146
Another example that illustrates the potential harm to consumers if the generic 
drug manufacturer had not been able to enter the market is the case of the brand-name 
Aricept, another Alzheimer’s and dementia treatment.147 When the generic version, 
Donepezil, entered the market, prices dropped from $230 for a thirty-day supply to 
less than $10.148 That amounts to potential savings of more than $2,600 per year for 
one drug. Most individuals with Alzheimer’s disease are aged sixty-five or older,149 a
population that relies heavily on income from Social Security.150 Being able to save 
potentially thousands of dollars per year on the cost of medication greatly benefits 
consumers who are most likely to be on fixed income.
Against this significant burden weighs the benefit of maintaining a brand-name 
drug manufacturer’s exclusivity, the expiration of which results in companies losing 
potentially billions of dollars in revenue.151 This loss in revenue could result in lost 
jobs if the drug companies fail to find new revenue sources.152 But other methods can 
help companies facing a patent cliff avoid such extensive losses, maintain their 
positions in the industry, and protect their future earnings and revenue stream.153 One 
way is to develop a generic version of the brand-name drug that the company 
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developed, marketed, and sold for years before their patent expired.154 This is a way 
that a company can continue to explore the market in which they have enjoyed 
exclusivity for so long if courts adopt the approach recommended in this Note. 
Although companies will not be able to engage in the same activities that they engaged 
in before, particularly those extending their patent protection beyond their initial 
exclusivity period, they will be able to create a generic drug that they could continue 
to market and sell, albeit at a lower price than their previous brand-name prescription 
drug.
This would create an environment where brand-name drug manufacturers become 
another actor in the generic market. The brand-name drug manufacturer may, in fact, 
have an advantage if they utilized their incumbent position in the market to position 
themselves in a manner to better effectuate marketing for a generic version of the 
brand-name drug. This approach may discourage a potential generic competitor from 
entering the market,155 even though this is not the type of competition that courts seek 
to curb.156 That is, as Judge Learned Hand warned, “[t]he successful competitor, 
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”157 It is not in 
the interest of courts to insert themselves into a scenario where that company 
successfully enters into the generic prescription drug market after formerly competing 
exclusively in the brand-name prescription drug market.158 Such a scenario would 
provide a roadmap for other companies facing similar difficulties, vis-à-vis, patent 
cliffs.
Ultimately, the harm at issue is the detrimental effect of a patent cliff on a 
corporation’s future revenue stream. While this harm is a significant event in the life-
cycle of a corporation, it pales in comparison to the harm consumers suffer when 
brand-name prescription drug manufacturers extend their market exclusivity. The 
harm brand-name drug manufacturers cause when they engage in activities that 
prevent the triggering of automatic drug substitution invariably results in higher 
industry costs and decreased opportunity for innovation. The anticompetitive harm, in 
this case, therefore cannot justify the procompetitive benefit.
C. The Pharmaceutical Industry Would Benefit from Weaker Patent Protection 
Because It Is an Industry Where Innovation Is Sequential and Complementary
In light of the detriment to consumers that extended patent protection provides, the 
industry as a whole may benefit more from “weaker” patent protection (i.e. a lack of 
the extended patent protection which constitutes “product hopping”) in the long run. 
Benefits of patent protection are not universal.159 That is, the benefits tend to be 
industry specific.160 Although some would argue that strong patent protection is a cure-
                                                          
154 Id. at 74.
155 Id. at 75.
156 Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1982).
157 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
158 See id. at 430–31.
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drug and the profits derived from its sale. Kodjak, supra note 4.
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all for lack-luster innovation,161 some industries benefit from a different approach. 
Software, for example, is an industry that has benefitted from, largely, weak patent 
protection.162 As mentioned previously, software arguably is an industry that is 
“sequential and complementary,” meaning inventions build on each other and each 
subsequent inventor approaches innovation differently.163 Some scholars have 
suggested enforcing a more stringent patentability requirement, which inventors 
would facilitate by targeting larger innovations to qualify for this more difficult 
standard.164 When a larger innovation is targeted, that innovation is more valuable 
economically because it is more difficult to achieve.165 Each successive innovation
advances the overall knowledge in a particular field more than simple, incremental 
innovations do.166 This is particularly true in an industry in which each successive 
advancement is sequential.167
In a similar way, the pharmaceutical industry meets both the “sequential” and 
“complementary” requirements. Prescription drugs are sequential because researchers 
and clinicians developing therapies across the spectrum of diseases and conditions 
inherently build on the knowledge of their predecessors.168 That is, the pharmaceutical 
industry is an industry wherein goals are mostly aligned; eradication of diseases, 
correction of disorders, and the healing of maladies form the point of convergence for 
anyone in the industry genuinely interested in achieving the industry’s ultimate 
purpose.169 Additionally, patent protection is inherently “sequential.” The so-called 
“novelty” requirement of United States patent law dictates that patents cannot be 
awarded for inventions that have been previously disclosed.170 Inventors working in a 
particular area, therefore, must understand what has been done before and build upon 
those technologies in a new way. The pharmaceutical industry is no different. This 
building on previous knowledge makes the pharmaceutical industry “sequential,” as 
defined above.171
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“Complementary” industries, essentially, are those in which innovators take 
varying paths toward a common goal, increasing the probability that that goal is 
achieved more quickly.172 The pharmaceutical industry is massive.173 Given the 
number of individuals participating in the industry, along with the incentive that actual 
innovation brings, the multitude of actors in the market have sufficient motivation to 
achieve innovative (i.e. patentable) solutions. The likelihood that some researchers 
will approach the same problem in different ways is high in a massive industry with 
equally massive incentive to solve that problem. As such, the pharmaceutical industry 
can be characterized as a “complementary” industry.
Sequential and complementary industries benefit from weaker patent protection by 
welcoming imitators, which lowers revenue in the short term, but, in the long term, 
such industries can boost revenue for each subsequent imitator, including the original 
inventor.174 This boost in revenue occurs because each successive iteration has the 
benefit of new insight that the previous inventor may not have possessed.175 The 
pharmaceutical industry would benefit from weaker patent protection because 
innovators would be able to take full advantage of the sequential and complementary 
nature of the pharmaceutical industry, spurring innovation while allowing new 
competitors to enter the market. Put another way, even if the Third Circuit’s approach 
were accepted by all jurisdictions, the industry would benefit more by disallowing 
obvious cases of product hopping.176 Ultimately, the goal of Hatch-Waxman is, 
therefore, better served in this environment.
D. Why Product Hopping Cannot Be Justified Based on Weighing Its Procompetitive 
Justifications Against Its Anticompetitive Harms
Maintaining strong patent protection is better for innovation because it provides 
greater incentive for companies to develop new drugs because that protection comes 
with market exclusivity (i.e. revenue).177 Pharmaceutical drug development is very 
costly.178 Strong patent protection is equitable and economically warranted due to the 
high cost of drug development.179 However, a recent study has demonstrated that a 
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relationship exists between research and development costs and profits derived from
those costs.180
One counterargument asserts that brand-name drug manufacturers do not engage 
in conduct amounting to a violation of the Sherman Act because their conduct does 
not impede the entry of competitors and because the procompetitive justifications
outweigh any anticompetitive harm that can be alleged.181 For example, in Mylan v. 
Warner Chilcott, the Third Circuit highlighted the district court’s finding that Warner 
Chilcott did not possess greater than eighteen percent market share in the relevant 
market (despite a presentation conducted by Warner Chilcott’s partner claiming much 
greater market share)182 as evidence that Warner Chilcott did not possess monopoly 
power in that market.183 This claim, however, misses the mark when the issue at hand 
is the type defined in this Note.
Traditional monopoly analysis is not sufficient when applied to the pharmaceutical 
market due to its unique characteristics.184 For example, the prescription drug market 
is dissimilar from other markets in that “the physician who chooses [the drug] does 
not pay . . . [and] [p]atients have little influence in determining which products they 
will buy and what prices they must pay for prescriptions.”185 This unequal power leads 
to an obvious disconnect between the selector of the prescription drug and the 
consumer because that consumer is not free to choose a product as she would be in a 
typical, traditional market. Monopoly analysis is primarily concerned with precisely 
the type of price control that brand-name prescription drug manufacturers exhibit.186
Formalistically and mechanically applying the monopoly analysis framework, 
therefore, is inappropriate in unique, economically imperfect markets. These markets 
have significant regulations designed to foster innovation and protect the innovator, 
while at the same time ensuring consumers have access to life-saving pharmaceuticals 
via competition from generic prescription drug manufacturers.187 Instead, the 
appropriate analysis should incorporate additional scrutiny into the type of market in 
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which the relevant actor is operating. Put simply, form should give way to function, 
and, with respect to cases of alleged product hopping, courts should employ a type of 
analysis that focuses on the activity in question’s impact on prices, not simply total 
market dominance.188
Another argument against imposing more rigorous judicial scrutiny is that the cost 
of developing prescription drugs is prohibitive absent guaranteed market exclusivity 
for an extended duration of time. As mentioned, developing a prescription drug is 
tremendously expensive.189 Proponents of this argument would stress that, as an 
incentive for companies to invest in these expensive endeavors, policy-makers must 
ensure they can benefit from the fruits of their labor.190 While this argument is 
persuasive on its face, it does not account for the fact that most companies greatly 
benefit from the current system without engaging in a product hopping strategy.191
Furthermore, an alternative could be for increased collaboration among prescription 
drug manufacturers, which could alleviate some of the financial burden of drug 
research and development. Cooperation between prescription drug manufacturers 
could allow them to benefit from pooled resources, lowering the up-front financial 
burden and perhaps getting the drug to the market faster from increased scientific 
understanding from their mutual efforts.
While the arguments in favor of maintaining the current system have some 
validity, they cannot sustain the system as it is. The detrimental effects of the current 
system require that a change be made in how prescription drug manufacturers are able 
to protect their intellectual property. Still, the alternative proposed, which relates to 
pooled resources, may provide a workable solution going forward, coupled with the 
increased scrutiny called upon by this Note. If prescription drug manufacturers pool 
their resources, the research and development savings may be sufficient to warrant a 
sacrifice in split profits. Furthermore, companies can leverage these relationships by 
saving on the substantial cost of marketing their drugs.192 Coupled with these proposed 
alternatives, the arguments against the proposal in this Note fail to shift the analysis 
in a persuasive way.
E. Monopoly Analysis Related to a Potential Case of Product Hopping Must Take 
the Abnormalities of the Pharmaceutical Market into Consideration
The analysis of suspected product hopping in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act 
should consist of a traditional monopoly analysis with the addition of a consideration 
of the relevant market. Specifically, courts should consider, as a third prong to the 
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analysis of potentially monopolistic conduct, whether the relevant market under 
review is typical or is one that has unique competitive (i.e., pricing) concerns lending
that market to a more skeptical judicial inquiry. In effect, this new prong would be a 
sub-issue of the first prong of the analysis concerning whether the market actor in 
question has market monopoly power.193 Courts have stated that monopoly power 
exists in a market when one product comprises two-thirds of the relevant market,194
ninety percent of the relevant market,195 and eighty-seven percent of the relevant 
market.196 A presentation detailing company performance from 2013 indicated that 
Mayne Pharma Group, Ltd. (Warner Chilcott’s partner in the production and 
distribution of Doryx) reported a sixty percent market share for Doryx.197 This 
substantial control of the market that treats severe acne puts the drug’s manufacturer 
in position to continue to drive up prices and harm consumers.
The prescription drug market is not like other markets. Pharmaceutical companies 
invest tremendous sums of money into research and development.198 This investment 
is superseded, however, by investment in marketing the fruits of research and 
development’s labors.199 For example, Johnson & Johnson spent twice as much on 
marketing than it did on research and development in 2013 ($17.5 billion and $8.2 
billion, respectively).200 The even more interesting part of this breakdown is 
determining the target of that marketing. In 2012, pharmaceutical companies spent 
$24 billion marketing toward physicians as compared to a relatively modest $3 billion 
marketing toward consumers.201 This discrepancy highlights a point previously made 
and articulated in the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Amicus Brief in support 
of Mylan: “the consumer who pays does not choose, and the physician who chooses 
does not pay.”202 Physicians, through no fault of their own, are the ones who limit 
consumers’ market by the very nature of the system of prescriptions. If courts refuse 
to accept the characteristics of the pharmaceutical market as being unique, and thus 
requiring bespoke analysis, rising prescription drug prices will continue to harm those 
same consumers who are powerless to affect change.
The FTC’s amicus brief filed after the Mylan decision urged the court to 
understand the differences in the pharmaceutical market. The FTC specifically argued 
that, given market differences, consumers will be harmed if this practice is permitted 
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to continue.203 The brief stressed that automatic substitution laws are “vital means to 
a successful competition since [they are] aimed to address the ‘disconnect between 
prescribing physicians and payors.’”204 Drug substitution laws, discussed supra, allow 
pharmacists to substitute cheaper, bioequivalent drugs for patients.205 This lowers 
costs and allows true competition from actors other than brand-name prescription drug 
manufacturers.206 The FTC’s concern that consumers would be harmed absent these 
laws is warranted and should be heeded by courts when addressing this issue.
Additionally, a legislative solution to the issue of product hopping may prove 
efficacious. Congress should enact a statute that treats the reformulation of an existing 
drug as a monopolistic practice per se. Such a statute would have the effect of placing 
the burden on the brand-name manufacturer to show that the new drug has a 
meaningfully different characteristic. The bar for “meaningfully different” should be 
established with the goal of preventing the practice of product hopping in the future. 
That is, the test should be fairly difficult to meet if the brand-name manufacturer has 
submitted a new drug to treat the same illness that its previous drug treated. The 
prescription drug manufacturer should have to demonstrate clinically relevant 
improvements with regard to the new drug’s formulation, method in which it is 
administered, effectiveness, or potential side effects before a patent may be granted 
on a drug.
While this requirement may seem unfair to brand-name drug manufacturers, it is a 
feasible way to dissuade product hopping, which has been shown to drive the increase 
in healthcare costs and ultimately harm consumers.207 The FDA is the proper agency 
to deal with this determination given its current position of being the regulator tasked 
with approving pharmaceutical drugs. Enacting a statute to effectuate this result 
should have the effect of minimizing product hopping issues. If litigated, because the 
presumption is that the new drug is equivalent to the former drug, the brand-name 
manufacturer would have to demonstrate to the court that that presumption is 
erroneous to avoid a finding of a violation of the Sherman Act.
Finally, a legislative solution to the issue of product hopping will allow the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office to better decide these issues instead of the courts. 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office, employing thousands of patent 
examiners who each have a technical degree making him or her a subject matter 
expert, is better equipped to resolve issues.208 Requiring a more substantive difference 
from the prior iteration of the drug when determining whether to grant a new patent 
will help prevent inherently anticompetitive conduct in the pharmaceutical industry 
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and will benefit consumers of prescription drugs by lowering their cost and 
encouraging larger leaps in therapeutic effectiveness to occur.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether to hear a case to resolve the circuit 
split discussed in this Note. Predicting how the Court would resolve this issue is 
difficult. On one side, the current jurisprudence would seem to require the Court to 
side with the Third Circuit, allowing product hopping strategies to continue.209
However, the Second Circuit’s approach, itself a departure from the current 
jurisprudence, is a better interpretation of the legislative intent of Hatch-Waxman and 
the patent system in general. The Second Circuit’s approach protects consumers, 
ensures competition from generic prescription drug manufacturers, and prevents 
practice that is clearly monopolistic.210 Furthermore, the Second Circuit’s approach 
will benefit both generic prescription drug manufacturers and brand-name prescription 
drug manufacturers, thus the entire industry. Similar to the software industry, 
manufacturers will be able to benefit from the increased innovative force 
accompanying the shift in jurisprudential understanding.
The patent system has been a tremendous driving force on innovation in the United 
States and around the world since the first patent was awarded hundreds of years 
ago.211 While different countries have varying standards and definitions for what may 
or may not qualify for patent protection, most systems largely revolve around similar 
ideas. Any patent system is designed to foster innovation by granting the innovator 
the right to exclude others from utilizing a particular product or engaging in a process 
defined by her patent.212 This provides incentive to invest the time, resources, and 
energy that innovation requires. Absent a substantial benefit, such as market 
exclusivity for a limited time, pace or quality of innovation may suffer. Within these 
systems are incentives to maintain this “limited” market exclusivity to continue 
generating the same revenue that has come to be expected from certain companies. 
For example, the manufacturers of prescription drug companies who have developed, 
marketed, and sold expensive drugs have an interest in maintaining market exclusivity 
via any route available. Oftentimes, maintaining market exclusivity takes the form of 
the questionably legal conduct known as product hopping. 
Product hopping constitutes a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act because its 
anticompetitive harm outweighs the procompetitive benefit. Product hopping 
increases prescription drug prices and ultimately harms consumers, typically by 
coercing them to switch to a new, more expensive drug that offers no substantial 
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increase in ease of administration, effectiveness, or decreased side effects.213 The issue 
has received increased attention recently, in part because of skyrocketing drug prices 
and healthcare costs as a whole.
Hatch-Waxman had a noble goal and proved to be successful legislation, allowing 
generic drug manufacturers to enter the market earlier and protecting brand-name drug 
manufacturer’s ability to monetize an incredibly expensive endeavor.214 Hatch-
Waxman improved a system that much needed assistance at the time of its enactment. 
However, further action must be taken to rectify inequity in the prescription drug 
market. That action should include preventing brand-name drug manufacturers from 
maintaining market exclusivity without changing or improving the drug for that 
specific market.
Recent litigation has created a circuit split between the Second and Third Circuits 
that is ripe for Supreme Court review. The Second Circuit has taken a consumer-
friendly approach and more rigorously applies the traditional monopoly analysis 
framework than the Third Circuit.215 The Second Circuit’s approach maintains the 
right balance between protecting a patent holder’s property right and its ability to 
recoup the massive monetary investment made in a particular drug and the effect on 
the price that consumers pay for these drugs.216 As this Note has stressed, the ultimate 
question when analyzing potentially monopolistic conduct is what effect does that 
conduct have on prices that will directly affect consumers. As a result, the Supreme 
Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s approach, specifically in its application of 
rule of reason scrutiny, which would spur innovation, lower industry costs, and 
ultimately lower costs for consumers, who are, in this case, uniquely vulnerable given 
their need for the product at issue.
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